guarantee of the objectivity of scientific theories." Recent work By John Krige and Paul Feyerabend ° suggests that Popper's world 3 epistemology represents a radical departure from the doctrine of critical dualism or critical conventionalism as set forth in the Open Society. 9 If they are correct in their analysis, it would appear that Popper has retreated from his earlier decision to treat logical and methodological laws as conventions and has instead granted them an objective validity apart from the decisions of in dividuals .
In this paper I wish to agrue, contrary to Krige and Feyer abend, that Popper's new epistemology is not a rejection of his earlier critical dualism but rather it is an attempt to allow for the existence of free normative decisions within the context of a binding tradition. As long as the individual has decided to work within a given tradition, he is subject to the canons of rationality and norms constitutive of that tradition; in this sense logical and methodological norms take on an objective^character. Traditions, being sociohistorical products, can be modified and altered but only within certain limits. Just what the limits of such modifi cation are can only be decided upon the basis of a fully developed theory of tradition. objective contents of thought, especially of scient poetic thoughts and o£ worts of art C world 3) .
itific and
In the following year, the same theme is developed with a stress on the relation of world 3 to certain Platonic views:
It introduces a tripartite world, or, as I prefer to say, a third world. ••• I wish to make this pluralistic phil osophy the starting point of my discussion, even though I am neither a Platonist nor a Hegelian.
In this pluralistic philosophy the world consists of at least three ontologically distinct sub-worlds; or, as I shall say, there are three worlds: the first is the physical world or the world of physical states; the second is the mental world or the world of mental states ; and the third is the world of intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense; it is the world of possible ob jects of thought; the world of theories in themselves, and their logical relations ; of arguments in themselves; and of problem situations in themselves.13
The denizens of this independently existing world are not the normal inhabitants of a Platonic heaven--concepts of things, or essences or natures of things; rather the inmates of world 3 are of the nature of logical relations, arguments, and problem situations. Popper is clear in maintaining that logical and methodological rules play key roles in world 3 : "Among the inmates of my "third world" are, more specifically, theoretical systems; but inmates just as important are problems and problem situations. And I will argue that the most important inmates of this world are critical arguments, and what may be called-in analogy to a physical state or a state of consciousness-the state of a discussion or the state of a critical argument ;•••Ml^ There can be no doubt that Popper wishes to include logical norms within the realm of his world 3.
At this point it is essential to note that for Popper, once a methodological or logical rule or norm is expressed in language, it becomes objective; normative decisions become transformed in Popper's new scheme into objective standards. To cite Popper directly: "This, I assert, is mainly due to the fact that a thought, once it is formulated in language, becomes an object outside ourselves; such a object can then be inter-subjectively criticized--criticised by ourselves as well as others. Inter-subjective or objective criticism in this sense only emerges with human world 3, the world of objective standards and of the content of our subjective thought processes."1-' The notion of objectivity is here being used as equivalent to inter-subjectivity such that normative decisions once expressed can be inter-subjectively binding. It is this notion of an objective standard that has led Krige and Feyerabend to conclude that Popper has rejected his earlier critical dualism.
In this analysis of the conoapf of an objective norm Popper turns to certain biological analogies. At one point we are told that world 3 is "a natural product of the human animal, comparable to a spider's web, ••• or nests built by wasps or ants, the burrows of badgers, dams constructed by beavers, or paths made by animals in forests." *6
For Feyerabend these analogies serve only to indicate that Popper is now treating methodological decisions as fasts in the natural world rather than as norms accepted by the free decision of individuals. This position is an over reaction, I believe, to what may have been an unfortunate analogy. The function of these biological analogies is not to argue that normative decisions must be construed on the basis of natural facts but rather to stress the objective nature of human knowledge, and its importance over all subjective concerns. The epistemologist has the choice of dealing with a whole range of subjective problems relating to the manner in which knowledge comes into being, i.e., with the formation of dis positions or beliefs, or he can concern himself with the objective structure of the final product of knowledge apart from its genesis,i.e., the logical relations exhibited within the theoretical structure itself. The main thrust of Popper's world 3 epistemology suggests that the advance and growth of knowledge can best be understood by studying the objective features of theoretical systems while placing all its sub jective aspects in the background.
When Popper suggests that world 3 ought to be studied independently of world 2, i.e., that the objective contents of thought ought to be appraised independently of any sub jectivity, he is making the claim that in the realm of scientific practice we ought be concerned with inter-subjective standards of preference only. 
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Since methodological rules and the laws of logic are norm ative laws, we would expect them, contrary to Feyerabend's anarchistic stance, to constrain our behaviour. A brief look at Popper's remarks in the Open Society makes it plain that critical dualism was not conceived as being incompatible with the restraint of individual behaviour. Normative laws like the laws of logic are in fact designed for the purpose of restraining individual behaviour.
Critical dualism is not to be confused with either anarchism or libertarianism. Returning to the Open Society, Popper informs us that "critical dualism merely asserts that norms and normative laws can be made and changed by man, more especially by a decision or convention to observe them or to alter them, and that it is therefore Man who is morally responsible for them; ••• Norms are man-made in the sense that we must blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither nature, nor God."27 Popper is here speaking of man in the collective sense; Man as opposed to God or nature has decided to accept certain norms. From this it does not follow that social norms are the result of individual decisions. Decisions can be the result of a consensus. Civil laws, for example, are not the result of individual decisions in the sense that they do not originate with the individual qua individual at least within the context of a democratic and open society. Every law must originate in some psychological state of mind but once expressed its acceptance is not an individual but rather a collective matter.
Apart from the issue of freedom and restraint in relation to the acceptance of norms, there is, I believe, another major misunderstanding at the core of Feyerabend's and Krige's analysis. Essentially both believe that an objective standard is self-contradictory,--that all standards or norms must be subjective. In order to be individually compelling, both believe, a norm must act on the level of an individual's psychological states. Krige is very explicit in equating the norms of the social world with the world of psychological states. To cite him directly: "As standards constraining our thinking they are merely conventions which we are free to adopt if we so choose. From the perspective of critical dualism, then, the notion of an objective standard is a contradiction in terms. In being objective, truths of logic and arithmetic cannot be normative and psychological, and in being standards they must be subjective." 28 All standards 27Popper, Open Society, p. 61. 2%rige, Inquiry, p. 321.
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for Krige must be subjective. Such, a view is simply a version of Popper's old enemy, -psychologism. Krige is correct in holding that all decisions originate with some psychological state but he fails to see that those decisions, once accepted and embodied within a tradition, are no longer world 2 objects. The laws that constitute the Athenian Constitution, for example, originated with a decision ultimately tracableto individual psychological states but once that Constitution was expressed in language and became part of a living tradition, it became objectively binding and normative and thus beyond the control of the individual qua individual to alter it. The point is that world 2 states become objectively embodied in world 3 once expressed and accepted as part of a tradition. At this point in time, norms are no longer merely subjective.
Krige's difficulty seems to be with the concept of an objective decision. The difficulty arises from the fact that the concept of a 'decision' is ambiguous. Popper points this out in his discussion of critical dualism: "We can speak of a 'decision' in two different senses. We may speak of a certain decision which has been submitted, or considered, or reached, or been decided upon, (This I take to be the world 3 sense of a decision as an objective content of thought. Let us refer to this usage as 'decision W3'.) or alternatively, we may speak of an act of deciding and call this a 'decision.( This I take to be the world 2 sense o fdecision. Let us refer to this usage as 1 decision W2'.)"^ Popper goes on to say that a 'decision W2' is a psychological fact, whereas 'decision W3' is a norm or standard and must be distinguished from a fact. Thus if we restrict our selves to the paradigm usage of 'decision W3', the idea of an objective standard or norm does not imply a rejection of critical dualism as Krige and Feyerabend argue.
'Decisions W2' are world 2 events and as such are private and non-linguistic but they can be transformed into world 3 objects by being embodied in the public linguistic tradition. In this sense objective norms can be understood as communal decisions that are both objective and normative.
III. Critical Dualism and a Return to a More Traditional Semantical Framework
It is my position that Popper's new epistemology can best be understood as the completion of his earlier critical dualism rather than its rejection. In this regard, the distinction between world 3 and world 2 can be seen as designed Popper, Open Society, I., 63.
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to prevent the reduction of objective norms and standards, in particular logical and methodological norms, to subjective states of mind, to psychological facts . Popper*s key move in this anti-reductionist program is to adopt a Fregean semantics in order to argue that objective norms are on a distinct semantical level from psychological facts,-the former are residents of world 3, the latter of world 2. The aim of this semantical move is in fact to reinforce the distinction between fact and norm so characteristic of critical dualism. Yet I would like to argue that Bolzano's position is not as absurd as it may initially sound. One understanding of his claim that propositions in themselves exist even if never articulated is that such propositions exist in the mind of God. This is a position that Bolzano in fact held. But without appealing to the mind of God, it is possible to understand Bolzano's claim in another sense: since already formulated and expressed propositions can give rise to an infinite number of logical consequences, it follows that not every member of the consequence class need be expressed. Some of these consequences would of course be true and others false. If, for example, it is possible to derive any proposition from a contradiction, it follows that any two logically contradictory propositions can have an infinitely large consequence class, many porpositions of which have neither been, nor ever will be, expressed. This argument alone proves to my satisfaction that there can be an in finitely large world of propositions in themselves that have never been articulated. This being the case, any talk of the psychological genesis of such propositions would be utter nonsense.
From the above argument it follows that there are true propositions (Wahrheiten-an-Sich) that have never been thought. The beauty of Bolzano's claim is that it allows us to speak of the objective contents of true propositions without the slightest concern for their origin in human subjectivity; logic and psychology have been clearly distinguished. The propositions that are the subject matter of logic are think able or expressable but are not necessarily thought or expressed; but Bolzano did believe, as we have seen, that the totality of such propositions was, in fact, known only to God.35 A fully complete science, I would take it, would be an exhaus tive list of all true propositions in themselves. et there are significant differences between Bolzano and Popper on the ontological level. Bolzano refuses to grant any ontological status to his SHtze-an-Sich: "They have no real existence, i.e., they are not of such a sort as to be in any place or at any time or in any other manner as anything real."3" Popper has no such problem. In his autobiography he expresses himself clearly on this issue of ontological status: "Bolzano was, I think, doubtful about the ontological status of his statements in themselves, and Frege, it seems, was an idealist, or very nearly so. I too was, like Bolzano, doubtful for a long time, and I did not publish anything about the third world until I arrived at the con clusion that its inmates were real; indeed, more or less as real as tables and chairs."^0 Popper, the staunch empiricist of the Vienna Circle, has taken the plunge that Bolzano was reluctant to take.
Frege
Popper gives the greatest credit for his world 3 views to the logician Frege: "My third world resembles most closely the universe of Frege's objective contents of thought."^1 ■^Kneale, Logic, p. 360. Somebody observes the moon through a telescope. I compare the moon itself to the referent ( Bedeutung) ; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to sense ( Sinn ), the latter to the conception or experience ( Vorstellung ). The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image, On account of the diverse shapes of the observer's eye's , even a geometrical congruence could hardly be achieved, and a true coincidence would be out of the question. 48 Table 1 , level # 2, Vorstellung would be analogous to the retinal images of each observer; such images are totally private affairs and are more the concern of psychology than of logic. It is important to realize that Frege introduces the level of Vorstellung simply to dismiss it from the realm of logic. In the same way, Popper introduces the notion of a subjective norm simply to dismiss it from the realm of methodology. Level #3, Sinn, would be analogous to the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope. It is objective in the Kantian sense that it can be seen and tested by anybody,--it can be used by several observers at once. Sinn is public property, it has an"objective content, Which is cap able of being the common property of several thinkers." 49 There is a clear parallel here to Popper's concept of intersubjective testability. 50 It is at the level of Sinn that we find objective norms and standards. Level #4, Bedeutung, is then analogous to the moon itself that we presuppose as a 48Frege, "Ueber," p. 30. 49Frege, "Ueber," p. 32, n.5.
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Returning to
-^Popper, Logic, p. 44.
E-l referent since our intent is not to speak of our idea of the moon but rather about the moon itself.
At this point I would like to draw the following con clusions regarding the identity between Frege's semantical framework as presented in Table 1 Table 2 Comparison The issue of psychologism came especially to the fore in relation to his position regarding critical dualism. If subjective and objective contents of thought are not sem antically distinguished^ it becomes too easy to confuse the notions of objective and subjective standards and norms. It was thus his effort to place critical dualism on a firmer footing by distinguishing two types of norms that led Popper to adopt a semantical framework more compatible with his concept of objectively valid criteria for scientific know ledge. ( See Table 3 .) By introducing the Fregean dis tinction between the objective as opposed to the subjective contents of thought, Popper is able to distinguish objective from subjective norms in such a way to allow for the pos sibility of objectively valid norms that are not reducible to psychological states. In this way he manages to shore up the notion of critical dualism rather than reject it. 5 4 5 5 54Popper, Logic, Ch. 1. For the epistemological anarchist, the highest good appears to be human freedom and spontaneity. 58 The one thing he opposes is universal objective standards. y To cite Feyerabend's review of Popper: "Nobody can be forced to accept any result, however 'rational', and anyone can escape the force of the most stringent argument by simply saying 'I don't like it.' " 60 if pushed far enough, the anarchist can drop out of the western research tradition entirely and move freely into the world of Carlos Castaneda.8 He is afforded this freedom as a result of his construal of all norms as subjective.
It is to combat this form of irrationalism that Popper turns to his new epistemology. The key to this move is the notion of an objectively valid norm,--once a standard is publicly accepted it becomes part of the tradition, part of world 3. The individual is then subject to the canons of rationality of that tradition. For Popper, research is only possible within the confines of a tradition, within the parameters of the objective norms that compose and con stitute that tradition. To drop that tradition for another and say " I don't like it" is to guarantee that absolutely no progress will ever be made. Naturally a distinction must be made between dropping a tradition and changing it.
The relation between an objectively valid tradition and progress can be seen clearly in the following passage:
You pick up, and try to continue, a line of inquiry which has the whole background of the earlier develop ment of science behind it; you fall in with the tradition of science. It is very simple and a decisive point, but nevertheless one that is not sufficiently realized by rationalists--that we cannot start afresh; that we must make use of what people before us have done in science. If we start afresh, then, when we die, we shall be about as far as Adam and Eve were when they died. 
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In science we want to make progress , and this means that we must stand on the shoulders of our predeces sors . We must carry on a certain tradition, * * * It tells us that people have already constituted in this world a kind of theoretical framework-not perhaps a very good one, but one which works more or less, it serves us a a kind of network, as a system of coordinates to which we can refer the various complexities of this world. We use it by checking it and by criticising it.
Feyerabend's critique of Popper's world 3 is mis guided, I believe, because it fails to see the absolute prerequisite of an objective tradition for any scientific progress. The objective norms that make up a tradition, that compose world 3, are simply community decisions that have become binding. In the case of the laws of logic they are community decisions accepted as the most ap propriate and effective way of guaranteeing the validity of deductive arguments. In regard to methodological rules, they are community decisions regarding the most effective and fruitful way of coming to understand the physical worlcT Such group decisions can be altered by critical judgment but in so far as they compose the tradition they are binding on all members of that tradition. Without an objective tradition, in Popper's scheme, there can be no progress. From this it follows that one is constrained by objective norms only if one is concerned about progress. An objectively existing world 3 must be seen as the found ation for a binding scientific tradition. 
